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Abstract 
We describe a viewpoint on the Dcmpstcr/Shafcr 
"Theory of Evidence", and provide an 
interpretation which regards the combination 
formulas as statistics of the opinions of 
"experts". This is done by introducing spaces 
with binary operations that arc simpler to 
interpret or simpler to implement than the 
standard combination formula, and showing that 
these spaces can be mapped homomorphically 
onto the Dempster/Shafcr theory of evidence 
space. The experts in the space of "opinions of 
experts" combine information in a Bayesian 
fashion. We present alternative spaces for the 
combination of evidence suggested by this 
viewpoint. 
1. Introduction 
Many problems in artificial intelligence call 
for assessments of degrees of belief in 
propositions based on evidence gathered from 
disparate sources. It is often claimed that 
probabilistic analysis of propositions is at 
variance with intuitive notions of belief [1, 2,3]. 
Various methods have been introduced to 
reconcile the discrepancies, but no single 
technique has settled the issue on both theoretical 
and pragmatic grounds. 
One method for attempting to modify 
probabilistic analysis of propositions is the 
Dempster/Shafer "Theory of Evidence." This 
theory is derived from notions of upper and 
lower probabilities, as developed by Dempster 
in (4]. The idea that intervals instead of 
probability values can be used to model degrees 
of belief had been suggested and investigated by 
earlier researchers [5,6,2, 7], but Dempster's 
work defines the upper and lower points of tb:: 
intervals in terms of statistics on set-valued 
functions defined over a measure space. The 
result is a collection of intervals defined for 
subsets of a fixed labeling set, and a combination 
formula for combining collections of intervals. 
, Dempster explained in greater detail how 
these notions could be used to assess beliefs on 
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propositions in [8]. The topic was taken up by 
Shafer [9, 10], ·and led to publication of a 
monograph on the "Theory of Evidence," [11]. 
All of these works after [8] emphasize the values 
assigned to subsets of propositions (the 
"beliefs"), and the combination formulas, and 
de-emphasize the connection to the statistical 
foundations based on the set-valued functions on 
a measure space. This paper will return to the 
original formulation by Dempster in [8] to relate 
the statistical foundations of the Dempster/Shafer 
theory of evidence to notions of beliefs on 
propositions. 
This paper has three main points. First, we 
show that the combination rule for the 
Dcmpster/Shafer theory of evidence may be 
simplified by omiting the normalization term. 
We next point out that the individual pairs of 
experts involved in the combination formula can 
be regarded as performing Bayesian updating. 
Finally, we present extensions to the theory, 
based on allowing experts to express probabilistic 
opinions and assuming that the logarithms of 
experts' opinions over the set of labels arc 
multi-normally distributed. 
:Z. The Rule of Combination and 
Normalization 
The purpose of this section is to show how 
one can dispense with the normalization term in 
the Dempster rule of combination. 
The set of possible outcomes, or labclings, 
will be denoted in this paper by A. This set is the 
"frame of discernment", and in other works has 
been denoted, variously, by n, 6, or S. For 
convenience, we will assume that A is a finite set 
with n elements, although the framework could 
easily be extended to continuous label sets. 
More importantly, we will assume that A 
represents a set of states that are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. 
An element (or state of belief) in the theory 
of evidence is represented by a probability 
distribution over the power set of A, P(A). That 
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Evidence as Opinions of Experts 
is, a state m is 
m : P(A)- [0,1], � m(A) = 1. 
A�\ (1a) 
There is an additional proviso that is typically 
applied, namely that every state m satisfies 
m(0) = 0. (1b) 
(ml ED m2}(A) = 1- � ml(B)mz(C) 
(2a) 
sr.c-0 
and is zero for A = 0. This is the so called 
"Dempster Rule of Combination." 
The problem with this definition is that the 
denominator in (2a) might be zero, so that 
(m1 ED m2)(A) is undefined. That is, there exist 
pairs m1 and m2 such that the combination of m1 
and m2 is not defined. This, of course, is not a 
very satisfactory situation for a binary operation 
on a space. The solution which is frequently 
taken is to avoid combining such elements. An 
alternative is to add an additional element mo to 
the space: 
mo(A) = 0 for A '* 0, mo(0) = 1. 
Note that this additional element does not satisfy 
the condition m (0) = 0. Then define, as a 
special case, 
m1EDm2 = mo if � ml(B)mz(C) = 1. (2b) BnC•0 
The binary operation is then defined for all pairs 
m 1, mz. The special element mo is an absorbent 
state, in the sense that moEDm = memo= mo for 
all states m. 
Definition 1: We define (.M ,ED), the space of 
belief states, by .M = {m satisfying (1a) and (lb)} 
.u {m0}, and define ED by (2a) when the 
denominator in (2a) is nonzero, and by (2b) 
otherwise. • 
The set .M, together with the combination 
operation ED, constitutes a monoid, since the 
binary operation is closed and associative, and 
there is an identity element. In fact, the binary 
operation is commutative, so we can say that the 
space is an abelian monoid. 
Still, because of the normalization and the 
special case in the definition of ED, the monoid .M 
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is both ugly and cumbersome. It makes better 
sense to dispense with the normalization. We 
have 
Definition 2: We define (.M ',ED'), the spac� of 
unnormalized b�li�f stat�s, by .M ' = 
{ m satisfying (1a) } without the additional 
proviso, and set 
(mle'mz)(A) = � m1(B)·mz(C) (3) BnC•A 
for all A �A and for all pairs m1om2E .M '. • 
One can verify that m 1ED 'mz E .M ', and that ED' is 
associative and commutative, and that there is an 
identity element. Thus .M' is also an abelian 
monoid. Clearly, .M ' is a more attractive monoid 
than .M. 
We define a transformation V mapping .M' to 
.M by the formulas 
m(A) 
_ (Vm)(A) = 1 - m(0)
, (Vm) (0) - 0 (4) 
if m (0) '* 1, and V m = m0 otherwise. 
A computation shows that V preserves the 
binary operation; i.e., 
V(m1ED'm2) = V(ml)eV(mz). 
Thus V is a homomorphism. Further, V is onto, 
since for m E .M , the same m is in .M ', and 
V m = m. The algebraic terminology is that V is 
an epimorphism of monoids, a fact which we 
record in 
Lemma 1: V maps homomorphic:ally from 
(.M',e') onto (.M,e). • 
A "representation" is a term that refers to a 
map that is an epimorphism of structures. 
Intuitively, such a map is important because it 
allows us to consider combination in the space 
formed by the range of the map as combinations 
of preimage elements. Lemma 1 will eventually 
form a small part of a representation to be 
defined in the next section. 
In the case in point, we see that combination 
can be done without a normalization factor. If it 
is required to combine elements in .M, one can 
perform the combinations in .M ', and project to 
.M by V after all of the combinations are 
completed. In terms of the Dempster/Shafer 
theory of evidence, this result says that the 
normalization in the combination formula is 
essentially irrelevant, and that combining can be 
handled by Equation (3) in place of Equation 
(2a). 
3. Spaces of Opinions of Experts 
In this section, we introduce two new spaces, 
based on the opinions of sample spaces of 
Hummel and Landy 
experts, and discuss the evaluation of statistics of 
experts opinions. Finally, w_e interpret the 
combination rules in' these spaces as being a form 
of Bayesian updating. In the following section 
we will show that these spaces also map 
homomorphically onto the space of belief states. 
Thus our intent is to show that the 
Dempster/Shafer space of belief states can be 
interpreted as the statistics of experts updating 
their opinions in a Bayesian fashion. The reason 
why the formulas don't look like Bayesian 
updating is that instead of having a single expert, 
there are collections of experts, updating in 
pairs. Thus instead of keeping track of the 
opinion of a single expert receiving evidence 
from different sources, we will see that the space 
of beliefs can be viewed as the statistics of 
collections of experts, combining their opinions 
in a Bayesian fashion, where each collection of 
experts represents an independent source of 
information. We begin by giving a formal 
introduction to the spaces of expert and their 
methods of combination. 
3.1. Opinions of Experts 
We consider a set c of "experts", together 
with a map 1.1. giving a weight or strength for 
each expert. It is convenient to think of c as a 
large but finite set, although the essential 
restriction is that c should be a measure space. 
Each expert wE c maintains a list of possible 
labels: Dempster uses the notation r(w) for this 
subset; i.e., r(w )CA. Here we will assume that 
each expert w has more than just a subset of 
possibilities r( (I)) ' but also a probabilistic opinion 
Pw defined on A, such that Pw(A) is a probability 
distribution over A EA. The value p w(A) 
represents expert w 's assessment of the 
probability of occurrence of the label A. Except 
in the case that w has no opinion (see below), we 
necessarily have 
�Pw(A) = 1. li.EA 
If an expert w believes that a label A is possible, 
i.e., A E r ( w ), then the associated probability 
estimate p .,(;\.) will be nonzero. Conversely, if w 
thinks that A is impossible (U r ( w)), then 
Pw(A) ;= 0. We also include the possibility that 
expert w has no opinion which is indicated by the 
special element p w !!!! 0. This state is included in 
order to ensure that the binary operation, to be 
defined later, is closed. We denote the collection 
of probabilistic opinions { p., I wEt } by P. 
It will turn out that the central point in the 
theory of evidence is that the p �.��(A) data is used 
only in terms of test for zero. Specifically, we 
set 
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{1 if Pw(A.) > 0 
x�.��(A.) = 0 if p�.��(:�.) = 0. 
(S) 
Note that x�.�� is the characteristic function of the 
set r(w) over A, i.e., x�.��(A.) = 1 iff AEr(w). 
The collection of all x �.��'s will be denoted by X, 
and will be called the boolean opinions of the 
experts e. 
If we regard the space of experts e as a 
sample space, then each x�.��(A) can be regarded as 
a sample of a random (boolean) variable x(A). 
In a similar way, the Pw(A)'s are also samples Qf 
random variables p (A.). In the next section, we 
will define the state of the system will be defined 
by statistics on the set of random variables 
{x(A)h.EA· These statistics are measured over the 
space of experts. If all experts have the same 
opinion, then the state should describe that set of 
possibilities, and the fact that there is a 
unanimity of opinion. If there is a divergence of 
opinions, the state should record the fact. The 
essential idea here is that we measure uncertainty 
in a probabilistic or boolean opinion by sampling 
a variety of opinions among a collection of 
experts, and observe the spread in those 
opinions. 
A key aspect to the spaces of opinions of 
experts is that collections of experts are 
combined by taking product sets of experts. That 
is, suppose t1 is one set of experts with their 
opinions, and &2 is another set of experts with 
their opinions. The combination element will 
have as its set of experts the product set e 1 x c 2• 
It might seem more desirable to make use of the 
disjoint union of c 1 and &2, but then the 
connection with the Dempster/Shafer combination 
formula would not hold. The statistics of the 
combination element will depend on the statistics 
of the constituent elements because combination 
is defined by taking a product set of experts. 
Pairs of experts combine their opinions in an 
essentially Bayesian fashion. Under fairly 
standard independence assumptions, two experts 
should update their probabilistic assignment for a 
given label by taking the product of their 
individual probabilities, and dividing by a prior 
probability. The resulting values have to be 
normalized so that they remain probabilities. In 
terms of the boolean opinions, Bayesian updating 
with the same independence assumption asserts 
that two experts agree that a label is possible 
only if both experts believe the label to be 
possible. 
We are now ready to introduce the spaces 
which we will term "opinions of experts." The 
central point is that the set of labels A is fixed, 
but that the set of experts c can be different for 
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distinct elements in these spaces. 
Definition 3: The space of boolean opinions of 
experts, ()1',0), is defined by: 
)I' = {(t, J.L,X) I #t < oo, J.L is a measure on t, 
X= {x,,,}wE!, Xw: A� {0,1} 'v'w}. 
If (thJ.LhX0 and (t2,J.L2,X2) arc clements in )1', 
define their product 
(C',J.L,X) = (tl,J.Ll,X0 0 (t2,J.L2,X2) 
by 
and 
where X1 = {x�l Jw tE £1}, fori = 1,2. • I 
Definition 4: Let K = {Kx} be a set of positive 
constants indexed over the label set A. The 
space of probabilistic opinions of experts (N,K ,®) 
is defined similarly, except that )I consists of 
triples (t,J.L,P), where P contains probabilis'tic 
optntons (as introduced earlier), and that 
combination of those probabilistic opinions is 
defined by 
�p�1{(A')p9j(A')(Kx-) 1 ' 
providing the denominator is nonzero, and 
P(ww)=O 1, 2 
otherwise. Here, P1 = {p�l}wet for 1=1,2, and I I I 
the Kx's are a fixed set of positive constants 
defined for A EA. • 
To interpret this combining operation, 
consider two sets of experts t 1 and £2, with each 
set of experts expressing opinions in the form of 
P1 and P2• We form a new set of experts, which 
is simply the set of all committees of two, 
consisting of one expert from t h and another 
from t2• In each of the committees, the 
members confer to determine a consensus 
opmton. In the probabilistic case, one can 
interpret the formulas as Bayesian combination 
(where Kx is the prior probability Prob ( 11 ) on 
A). In the boolean case, the consensus is simply 
the intersection of the composing opinions (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. A depiction of the combination of two boolean 
opinions of two experts, yielding a consensus opinion by the 
element in the product set of experts formed by the committee 
of two. 
3.2. Statistics of Experts 
It . will turn out that the Dempster/Shafer 
theory of evidence can be viewed as a mechanism 
for tracking statistics in the space of opinions of 
experts. We accordingly now define what is 
meant by the statistics of an element 
(t,J.L,X)EN'. 
Statistics will be computed by summing the 
weights of experts in subsets of t. If the experts 
have equal weights, this is equivalent to counting 
the number of experts. In general, we will sum 
the weights of experts in a subset :JCt, and 
denote the result by J.L(7). Thus J.L is in fact a 
measure on t, although it is completely 
determined by the weights of the individual 
experts J.L({w}) for w Et. (We are assuming that 
t is finite.) 
For a given subset A CA, the characteristic 
function XA is defined by {0 if HA 
XA(A) = 1 if A EA. 
Equality of two functions defined on A means, 
of course, that the two functions agree for all 
AEA. 
Given a space of experts t and the boolean 
opinions X, we define 
• 
J.L{W Et J Xw = XA} 
m (A) = 
J.LU} 
(5) 
for every subset A CA. It is possible to view the 
values as probabilities on the random variables 
{x(A)}. We endow the clements of t with the 
prior probabilities J.L({w})/�J.(t), and say that the 
Hummel and Landy 
probability of an event involving a combination 
of the random variables x(ll.)'s over the sample 
space £ is the probability that the event is true 
for a particular sample, where the sample is 
chosen at random from e with the sampling 
distribution given by the prior probabilities. This 
is equivalent to saying 
P b(E )= f.I:({(I)H I Event is true for(l)}) rr vent J.L{ 
G
} . 
With this convention, we see that 
ni(A) = Prob(x(>..) = XA(>..) for all>..). ! 
In fact, all of the priors and joint statistics of the 
x(A)'s are determined by the full collection of 
ni (A) values. For example, 
and 
Prob(x(>-o) 
= 
1) = k m(A) 
{Ajl..0EA} 
Prob(x(ll.o) - 1 and x(l\.1) - 1) - k ni(A). 
{Aj>.0,l..1 EA} 
Further, the full set of values ni(A) for A�A 
defines an element ni E .M '. To see this, it 
suffices to check that �ni(A) 
= 
1, which 
amounts to observing that for every (I), x., = XA 
for some A �A. 
Many of the quantities in the theory of 
evidence can be interpreted in terms of simple 
conditional probabilities on the x(>..)'s. For 
example, the belief on a set A, 
Bel(A) - k m(B) 
B!:A 
is simply the joint probability that 
x(>..) 
= 0 for >.£A conditioned on the assumption 
that x(}..) * 0 for some }.EA. In a similar way, 
plausibility values 
Pl(A) = k m(B) = 1-Bel(A) 
81"'A .. 0 
can be interpreted as disjunctive probabilities, 
and the commonality values 
Q(A) 
= 
km(B) 
A!:B 
are a kind of joint probability. 
To recapitulate, we have defined a mapping 
from P values to X values, and then 
transformations from X to m and m values. The 
resulting element m, which contains statistics on 
the X variables, is an element in the space of 
belief states .M of the of the Dempster/Shafer 
theory of evidence (Section 2). 
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4. Equivalence with the Dempster/Shafer 
Rule of Combination 
At this point, we have four spaces with 
binary operations, namely (JJ,®), (JJ' ,0), 
(.M ',e'), and (.M ,e). We will now show that 
these four spaces are closely related. It is not 
hard to show that the binary operation is, in all 
four cases, commutative and associative, and that 
each space has an identity clement, so that these 
spaces are abelian monoids. We also have 
DeffnltJon 5: The map T : JJ - ).!' , with 
(£,�Jo.X) = T(e,�Jo,P), is given by equation (4), 
i.e., x.,(>..) 
= 
1 iff p.,(>-)>0, and x.,(>..) = 0 
otherwise. • 
There is another mapping U, given by 
Definition 6: The map U : JJ' - .M ' with 
ni = U(t,J.L.X) given by equation {5), i.e., 
m(A) 
= f.I:({(I)EGix., = XA})/�o�o({£}). • 
We claim that T and U preserve the binary 
operations. More formally, we show that T and 
U are homomorphisms of monoids. However, 
proofs arc omitted here; we refer the interested 
reader to the larger report [12]. 
Lemma l: Tis a homomorphism of JJ onto JJ'. 
Lemma 3: U is a homomorphism of).!' onto M '. 
Recall from Section 2 that the map V:M '-.M 
is also a homomorphism. So we can compose the 
homomorphisms T:J/-JJ' with U:N' -M ' with 
V :.M '� .M to obtain the following obvious 
theorem. 
Theorem: The map VoUoT:JI-.M is a 
homomorphism of monoids mapping onto the 
space of belief states (.M ,e). • 
This theorem provides the justification for the 
viewpoint that the theory of evidence space .M 
represents the space Jl via the representation 
V•U•T. 
The· significance of this result is that we can 
regard combinations of elements in the theory of 
evidence as combinations of elements in the 
space of opinions of experts. For if m1o • • • ,mk 
are elements in .M that are to be combined under 
$, we can find respective preimages in Jl under 
the map VoUoT, and then combine those 
elements using the operation ® in the space of 
opinions of experts )J. After all combinations in 
).! are completed, we project back to .M by 
V•U•T; the result will be the same as if we had 
combined the elements in .M. The advantage to 
this procedure is that combinations in Jl are 
conceptually simpler: there are no funny 
normalizations, and we can regard the 
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combination as Bayesian updatings on the 
product space of experts. 
5. An Alternative Method for Combining 
Evidence 
With the viewpoint that the theory of 
evidence is really simply statistics of opinions of 
experts, we can make certain remarks on the 
limitations of the theory. 
(1) There is no usc of probabilities or degrees of 
confidence. Although the belief values seem to 
give weighted results, at the base of the theory, 
experts only say whether a condition is possible 
or not. In particular, the theory makes no 
distinction between an expert's opinion that a 
label is likely or that it is remotely possible. 
(2) Pairs of experts combine opinions in a 
Bayesian fashion with independence assumptions 
of the sources of evidence. In particular, 
dependencies in the sources of information are 
not taken into account. 
(3) Combinations take place over the product 
space of experts. It might be more reasonable to 
have a single set of experts modifying their 
opinions as new information comes in, instead of 
forming the set of all committees of mixed pairs. 
Both the second and third limitations come 
about due to the desire to have a combination 
formula which factors through to the statistics of 
the experts and is application-independent. The 
need for the second limitation, the independence 
assumption on the sources of evidence, is well­
known (see, e.g., [13]). Without incorporating 
much more complicated models of judgements 
under multiple sources of knowledge, we can 
hardly expect anything better. 
The first objection, however, suggests an 
alternate formulation which makes use of the 
probabilistic assessments of the experts. 
Basically, the idea is to keep track of the density 
distributions of the opinions in probability space. 
Of course, complete representation of the 
distribution would amount to recording the full 
set of opinions p w for all w. Instead, it is more 
reasonable to approximate the distribution by 
some parameterization, and update the 
distribution parameters by combination formulas. 
We present a formulation based on normal 
distributions of logarithms of updating 
coefficients. Other formulations are possible. In 
marked contrast to the Dempster/Shafer 
formulation, we assume that all opinions of all 
experts are nonzero for every label. That is, 
instead of converting opinions into boolean 
statements by test for zero, we will assume that 
all the values are nonzero, and model the 
14 1 
distribution of their strengths. 
In a manner similar to [14], set [ Prob(A Is;) ] 
L (A I St) = log Prob(A) , 
where Prob(A Is;) is a probability of label A being 
the correct labeling, among labeling situations, 
conditioned on some information s1 shared by the 
collection of experts t1• (Note, incidentally, that 
the L (A Is;) values are not the so-called "log­
likelihood ratios"; in particular, they can be both 
positive and negative). Using some fairly 
standard assumptions in Bayesian updating, (see 
(14]), we obtain 
Iog[Prob(A lsl> · · · ,sk)] == 
k 
c + log[Prob(A)] + �L(A ls1), 
1•1 
where c is a constant independent of A (but not 
of s1, • • • ,sk)· 
The consequence of this formula is that if 
certain independence assumptions hold, and if 
Prob(A) and L(Aist) are known for all A and i, 
then the approximate values Prob(A lsl> · · · ,sk) 
can be determined. 
Accordingly, we introduce a space which we 
term "logarithmic opinions of experts." For 
convenience, we will assume that experts have 
equal weights. An element in this space will 
consist of a set of experts t1, and a collection of 
opinions Y; = {y�l}wee/ Each y�l is a map, and 
the component y�l(A) represents expert w's 
estimate of L(A ls1): 
y�l: A -lR, y�l(A) =:: L(Ais;). 
Note that the experts in t1 all have knowledge of 
the information s1, and that the estimated 
logarithmic coefficients L (:\.Is;) can be positive or 
negative. In fact, since the experts do not 
necessarily have precise knowledge of the value 
of Prob(:\.), but instead provide estimates of log's 
of ratios, the estimates can lie in an unbounded 
range. 
Combination in the space of logarithmic 
opinions of experts is defined much the same as 
our earlier combination formulas, except that 
now consensus opinions are derived by adding 
component opinions. Specifically, the 
combination of (tl>Yv and U2,Y2) is (t1xt2,Y), 
where 
and 
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Next, in analogy with our map to a statistical 
space (Section 3.2), we can define a space which 
might be termed the "parameterized statistics of 
logarithmic opinions of experts." Elements in 
this space will consist of pairs (u,C), where u 
will be a mean vector in 1Rn and C is a symmetric 
n by n covariance matrix. To project from the 
space of logarithmic opinions to the space of 
parameterized statistics, define u, to be the 
average value of y.,('A1) over wEe, where 
A={'Ah · · • ,'An} is a fixed ordering of the 
clements in the label set. Then the vector u is 
defined by u = (uh · · · ,un)· Likewise, define 
c11 as the average value of 
(y.,('A1)-u1)·(y.,(>..1)-uJ) over wEG, and set C 
equal to the matrix whose l,j-th component is 
given by Cfj• 
Combinations in the space of statistics must 
be defined in such a way that the map from the 
collections of op1n1ons to the mean and 
covariance& forms a homomorphism. We are 
led, after some calculation, to the definition: 
(Ui1>,c<1l) e (Ui2>,c<2l) = (Uill+Ui2l,c<1>+c<2l). 
That is, since the components are added on the 
product space of experts, the means and 
covariances separately add. An extension to the 
case where !1 and e2 have nonequal total weights 
is straight-forward. 
To interpret a state (u,C) in the space of 
parameterized statistics, we must remember the 
origin of the logarithmic-opinion values. 
Specifically, after lc updating iterations combining 
information s1 through sk, the updated vector 
i = (Yt. · · · ,yn)E1R" is an estimate of the sum 
of the logarithmic coefficients, 
k 
YJ ::::: �L('Ais,). 
1•1 
The a posteriori probability of a label >..1 is high 
if the corresponding coefficient y1+log[Prob('Aj)] 
is large in comparison to the other components 
Yj+ log[Prob(>..1)]. 
Since the state (u,C) represents a 
multinormal distribution in the log-updating 
space, we can transform this distribution to a 
density function for a posteriori probabilities. 
The vector u represent the center of the 
distribution (before bias by the priors). The 
spread of the distribution is given by the 
covariance matrix, which can be thought of as 
defining an ellipsoid in IRn centered at u. The 
exact equation of the ellipse can be written 
implicitly as: 
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Ci-ii)Tc-1(j-ii) = 1. 
. This ellipse describes a "one sigma" variation in 
the distribution, representing a region of 
uncertainty of the logarithmic opinions; the 
distribution to two standard deviations lies in a 
similar but enlarged ellipse. The eigenvalues of 
C give the squared lengths of the semi-major 
axes of the ellipse, and are accordingly 
proportional to degrees of confidence in the 
corresponding directions. Bias by the prior 
probabilities simply adds a fixed vector, with 
components log[Prob(>..1)], to the ellipse, thereby 
translating the distribution. We seek an axis j 
such that the components YJ of the vectors y lying 
in the translated ellipse are relatively much larger 
than other components of vectors in the ellipse. 
In this case, the preponderant evidence is for 
label >..1• 
Clearly, the combination formula is extremely 
simple. Its greatest advantage over the 
Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence is that only 
O(n2) values are required to describe a state, as 
opposed to the zn values used for a mass 
distribution in .M. The simplicity and reduction 
in numbers of parameters has been purchased at 
the expense of an assumption about the kinds of 
distributions that can be expected. However, the 
same assumption allows us to track probabilistic 
opinions (or actually, the logarithms), instead of 
converting all opinions into boolean statements 
about possibilities. 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown how the theory of evidence 
may be viewed as a representation of a space of 
optmons of experts, where opinions are 
combined in a Bayesian fashion over the product 
space of experts. By "representation", we mean 
something very specific - namely, that there is a 
homomorphism mapping from the space of 
opinions of experts onto the Dempster/Shafer 
theory of evidence space. This map fails to be an 
isomorphism (which would imply equivalence of 
the spaces) only insofar as it is many-to-one. In 
this way the state in the theory of evidence 
represents a corresponding collection of 
elements. 
Furthermore, combination in the space of 
opinions of experts, as defined in Section 3, leads 
to combination in the theory of evidence space. 
This allows us to implement combination in a 
somewhat simpler manner, since the formulas for 
combination without the normalization are 
simpler than the more standard formulas, and 
also permits us to view combination in the theory 
of evidence space as the tracking of statistics of 
opinions of experts as they combine information 
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in a pairwise Bayesian fashion over the product 
space of experts. 
From this viewpoint, we can see how the 
Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence accomplishes 
its goals, and what independence assumptions are 
needed. Degrees of support for a proposition, 
belief, and plausibilities, are all measured in 
terms of joints and disjunctive probabilities over 
a set of experts who are naming possible labels 
given current information. The problem of 
ambiguous knowledge versus uncertain 
knowledge, which is frequently described in 
terms of "withholding belief," can be viewed as 
two different distributions of opinions. In 
particular, ambiguous knowledge can be seen as 
observing high densities of opinions on particular 
disjoint subsets, whereas uncertain knowledge 
corresponds to unanimity of opinions, where the 
agreed upon opinion gives many possibilities. 
Finally, instead of performing Bayesian updating, 
a set of values are updated in a Bayesian fashion 
over the product space, which results in non­
Bayesian formulas over the space of labels. 
In meeting each of these goals, the theory of 
evidence invokes compromises that we might 
wish to change. For example, in order to track 
statistics, it is necessary to model the distribution 
of opinions. If these opinions are probabilistic 
assignments over the set of labels, then the 
distribution function will be too complicated to 
retain precisely. The Dempster/Shafer theory of 
evidence solves this problem by simplifying the 
opinions to boolean decisions, so that each 
expert's opinion lies in a space having zn 
elements. In this way, the full set of statistics 
can be specified using 2n values. We have 
suggested an alternate method, which retains the 
probability values in the opinions without 
converting them into boolean decisions, and 
requires only O(n2) values to model the 
distribution, but fails to retain full information 
about the distribution. Instead, our method 
attempts to approximate the distribution of 
opinions with a Gaussian function. 
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